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Abstract
Experiments were conducted on an asset with the structure of an option. The infor-
mation of any individual is limited, as if only the direction of movement of the option
value known for a single period without information of the value from when movement
was initiated. However, if all information of all insiders were pooled, the value of the
option would be known with certainty. The results are the following: (1) Information
becomes aggregated in the prices as if fully informative rational expectations operated;
and (2) The mechanism through which information gets into the market is captured by
a path dependent process that we term \The Fundamental Coordination Principle of
Information Transfer in Competitive Markets". The early contracts tend to be initiated
by insiders who tender limit orders. The emergence of bubbles and mirages in the mar-
kets are coincident with failures and circumstances that prevent the operation of the
\Fundamental Principle."
JEL classi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Key words: Microstructure Information, Rational Expectations Experiments, Informa-
tion Aggregation, Belief Formation, Bubbles, Cascades
 2 
ON THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF PRICE DETERMINATION AND 
INFORMATION AGGREGATION WITH SEQUENTIAL AND ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION ARRIVAL IN AN EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKET 
 
Martin Barner1, Francesco Feri2 and Charles R. Plott3 
 
1. Introduction4 
 
This paper is motivated by the capacity of asset markets to adjust to the time 
dynamics of partial information about returns including information that is asymmetrically 
held by different individuals at different times in the life of a security.  The questions are 
formed from a natural curiosity about the underlying principles that might be at work during 
the price discovery and information aggregation processes of markets.  As will be illustrated 
in the body of the report, substantial progress is made toward this understanding for the 
special environments investigated. 
The markets studied here have two major features.  First, common knowledge exists 
about the periodic structure of information release to individuals and common knowledge 
exists about the underlying states of nature and the asset payoff given states.  This common 
knowledge creates a framework through which the time path of the asset price might be 
understood by all agents in the market.  Second, information about the underlying state is 
asymmetric across individuals and is released sequentially at the designated periods.  In the 
end, complete information about the state and thus the asset payoff will exist if information 
held by the trading agents is aggregated, but such facts will not be known to any individual 
agent as private information.  Thus, the fundamental issue of information aggregation 
presents itself.  
Two broad questions organize the inquiry. (1) Does the time pattern of the asset 
prices reflect the expected value of the returns on the asset given the information available 
for aggregation and accumulation to date?  In essence, the question is whether or not the 
central principle of fully revealing Rational Expectations can be observed at work in such a 
complex environment.  A special case of this is the Black-Scholes model of options pricing 
where one of the assets traded is interpreted as an option and the information concerns the 
value of the underlying security.  The reflection of expected value in the asset price is also a 
key principle associated with Rational Expectations as applied to all markets.  As an 
empirical matter, the principle of Rational Expectations might not be expected to hold due to 
expectations about the future value of the asset, the possibility of speculative gains or even 
incomplete price adjustment that prevents past information to be properly integrated into the 
market.  (2) What is the process through which information finds its way into the market?  
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The “no trade” theorem resides at one end of the spectrum of theoretical possibilities.  The 
distinction between informed traders and noise (uninformed) traders also exists together with 
competing theoretical principles about the types of actions each will take.  The experiments 
permit a direct examination of the issues. 
Rich theoretical and experimental literatures are focused on the nature of price 
discovery and information in markets.  For the most part, the principles that support classical 
theory have proved themselves to be powerful tools in predicting and explaining 
experimental observations but the understanding those tools provide is by no means 
complete.  A brief review of the experimental background will be useful and theoretical 
aspects are addressed in the section on models later in the paper.  The experiments reported 
here involve an integration of different parts of the overall puzzles addressed in the literature: 
the details of the price discovery process, the role of time in that process, and the aggregation 
of bits and pieces of relevant information held by different agents.  The approach has been 
from two perspectives.  One is to explore the capacities of markets to perform as suggested 
by theory and the other is to explore the detailed mechanisms through which such capacities 
come into being.  As will become apparent, this schizophrenic approach will be employed in 
this study as well. 
Questions regarding the price discovery process itself have been a challenge since 
Vernon Smith's (1962) [51] demonstration of the operation of the laws of supply and 
demand.  While the theoretical literature tends to assume the existence of a Walrasian 
auctioneer or market maker that functions along similar lines, for exceptions see Easley and 
Ledyard (1993) [21] and Plott and Turocy (1996) [47], the experimental literature contains 
greater focus on the details of how price adjustments might take place.  It is well established 
that the operation of the laws is sensitive to the details of market organization and, in that 
regard, the most efficient of market making process is thought to be the multiple unit double 
auction5, which was implemented in the markets studied here.  The dynamics of the price 
discovery process in double auction markets are known to be related to the classical excess 
demand, Anderson, et. al., (2004) [2], and insights about the way that excess demand 
translates itself into prices are becoming identified, see Cason and Friedman (2003, 1996) 
[14, 15], Brewer, et. al. (2002) [10] and Asparouhova, et. al. (2003) [5], together with the 
types of orders that they may execute during the price discovery process, Bloomfield, et. al. 
(forthcoming) [8].  
Time and assets impose particularly challenging features of behavior.  That markets 
are capable of guiding price discovery over time along the lines suggested by theory is well 
known, Forsythe, et. al. (1982, 1984) [21, 22], and Friedman, et.al. (1984) [27].  However, 
speculation and other features of agent choices can intervene to produce bubbles and other 
forms of unexpected behaviors, Smith, et. al. (1988) [50],  Abbink and Rockenbach (2004) 
[1].  Institutions thought to be important for immediate market "corrections" during the 
bubble periods, do not do so, but other instances in which individual behavior seems at odds 
with orderly market development are offset by the heterogeneity of agents, Kluger and Wyatt 
(2004) [33], Olivin and Rietz (2004) [40].  Bubbles themselves have been shown to be 
closely related to confusion on the part of agents, Lei, et. al. (2001) [35], which is a fact that 
                                                 
5 This mechanism is development and tested in Gray and Plott (1990) [44] as a generalization of the one unit 
double auction studied by Smith (1962) [51].  The multiple unit double auction has been implemented in several 
elections exchanged systems including the Marketscape system employed here.  
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will be used later.  Thus, any study of markets in which time plays a central role must be 
prepared for the emergence of phenomena that are not predicted by classical principles.  The 
same can be said about experiments with random variables.  However, slight adjustments to 
classical models have successfully captured the variability. 
That markets have the capacity to aggregate information has been well established 
since the discovery by Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988) [45, 46].  Aside from the fact of 
aggregation, they demonstrated important facts.  The nature of aggregation is sensitive to the 
instruments in the market.  (Plott 200, 2001) [42, 43].  In particular, if preferences are diverse 
the Arrow-Debreu securities are important but that is not the case if preferences are identical, 
or near so across agents.  Furthermore, informed agents tend to be the first to place orders in 
the market, a fact that will become important later in this report.  Subsequent research had 
replicated their findings, testing the sensitivity to the number of insiders, Watts (1993) [53] 
and Nöth and Weber (1999) [38] in addition to isolating the importance of experience and 
public knowledge of preferences under which information aggregation may and may not be 
expected, Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) [23], Ang and Schwarz (1985) [4].  As the number 
of states become expanded and the number of insiders become variable additional, bubble 
like phenomena, called mirages, begin to appear, Camerer and Weigelt (1990) [12].  The 
concept of a mirage will be important later as a tool to analyze the results reported here.  The 
market architecture (Chen and Plott, 2002) [16], as well as the possibility of collusion among 
market makers, can have a dramatic impact on the ability of markets to aggregate 
information, Cason (2000) [13]. 
When time and information asymmetries are both present, such as they are in the 
experiments reported here, the total of complexities introduced above exist plus some 
additional matters.  Copeland and Friedman (1987, 1991, 1992) [17, 18, 19] studied the 
effects of information arrival in a market with a single period showing that markets are 
sensitive to arrival but with mixed results regarding the capacity of market prices to fully 
reveal the information as is predicted by the fully revealing Rational Expectations model.  
More recently, Camerer, et. al. (1999) [11] have demonstrated the existence of "information 
traps" that can occur as a result of coordination and constraints such as cash constraints or no 
short sales constraints, that can result from information becoming available at different times 
or having relevance at different times.  The concept of an information trap will be used in 
sections below.   
2. Market environment and information 
 
The particular environment was motivated by the structure of an option with a given 
strike price.  Often the price of the underlying security is modeled as a random walk, with 
sequential information arriving about the price of the underlying security and thus the 
ultimate payoff of the option.  Thus, each period the information arrives about whether or not 
the price of the underlying asset went up or down, thus making the ultimate value of the 
option go up or down.  The issues center on how this complexity becomes incorporated into 
the asset price.   
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The asset structure: states and payoff 
Each session of the experiment is partitioned into periods and years.  A year consists 
of three periods during which trading can take place.  Figure 1 summarizes the time features 
of the environmental environment.  All markets are for a single asset that pays a single 
dividend depending on the state of nature.  There are four states of nature with associated 
dividends of 800, 600, 400 and 200.  The determination of the state of nature was as if nature 
performed an independent draw each period eliminating one of the states with the most 
extreme values (the highest value or the lowest value) from those that have not previously 
been eliminated.  From the point of view of a risk neutral agent, it is as though nature chose, 
with equal probability, the expected value of the state prior to the next period, beginning with 
a choice between 400 and 600.  Due to the structure of the binomial tree depicted in Figure 1, 
the states 600 and 400 each have a probability of 3/8 while the states 800 and 200 each have 
a probability of 1/8 of occurring.  This occurs as the individual draws up and down in each 
period are equally likely.   
The information structure  
 
The tree represented in Figure 1 was common knowledge.  Any information to be 
revealed was done at a node of the tree.  The specific information revealed at nodes and who 
received it differed according to the experimental controls imposed.  Two series of 
experiments were conducted, depending on the structure of the information that was 
revealed.  
In Series One, the “Symmetric Information” case, all agents were uninformed at the 
beginning of a period about the draws for the upcoming period and knew that no-one else had 
private information about the period.  At the end of the period the draw (up or down) was 
revealed in the form of a public announcement.  Thus, the expected value of the asset prior to 
the draw for the period was public information.  Accordingly, theory suggests a lack in the 
response to the actual movement until after the public announcement.  
In Series Two, the “Asymmetric Information” case, a subset of one-third of the agents 
was given information about the draw in the upcoming period and could use this to eliminate 
one of the extremes.  Thus, during the first period of a year the informed agents for that 
period would be able to eliminate either 800 or 200 from the possible states of nature.  Each 
period a different set of agents received private information, so no agent was ever informed 
about more than one period. 
Notice that although the asymmetric information structure is similar to the classical 
environment introduced in Plott and Sunder (1988) [46], major differences exist.  In Plott and 
Sunder, half the subjects could eliminate one of three states and another half another one of 
the three possible states.  Thus, no individual was perfectly informed, but the "market" was 
perfectly informed of the state and the market computation could be known by a simple 
pooling of the states that could be eliminated by individuals.  In the experiments explored, 
the "market" is fully informed in the sense that a pooling of all individual private information 
(the content of the information and when the information arrived) would produce certain 
information about the state.  However, the pooling is much more complex than in Plott and 
Sunder.  Based on private information alone, each individual can eliminate only one of the 
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two states (800 or 200).  That is the pooling of states eliminated by private information 
removes only one or both of these two states but does not reveal the final state with certainty.  
For the final state to be computed, the timing of the private information must also be used.  
The significance of this fact is that the market must not only aggregate the information 
content, but must also aggregate the information timing if market performance along the lines 
of a fully revealing Rational Expectations equilibrium is to be observed. 
In these experiments all agents are informationally small in the sense of Gul and 
Postlewaite (1992) [29].  Agents are informationally small, according to the Gul and 
Postlewaite concept if “…the incremental information of an agent given the information of 
everyone else …(is).. small”6.  In other words, the removal of the information held by a 
single individual does not change the aggregate of information in the market.  Notice that in 
Series Two (Asymmetric Information) the condition is satisfied since three or more 
individuals have identical information.  Removal of one of them leaves the aggregate of 
information in the market unchanged.  The key point is that information smallness creates 
competition among the informed subjects and thereby competitive incentives to reveal their 
private information.  As an aside, if two of the informed individuals are confused or do not 
participate for some reason, the remaining individual is no longer informationally small. 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
The main features of the experiments are summarized in Table 1.  A total of five 
experimental sessions were conducted.  They are indexed by the date of the experiment. Each 
of the five sessions lasted for two hours.  The number of subjects in each session varied from 
nine to seventeen.  Subjects were recruited from the Caltech student community with one 
exception.  In 040506, three students from UCLA participated. 
The basic setup for all experiments was the same.  Caltech’s web-based trading 
system Marketscape was used.  It is a continuous, open book, double auction where 
information on the time series of all trades and orders in the book are public.  Subjects place 
orders that are placed in the order book unless they can be crossed with orders that exist in 
the book from the other side of the market, in which case a trade or transaction is facilitated.  
As will be discussed in greater detail later, we define those who place orders that go into the 
order book as having placed a "limit order" and orders that are crossed immediately with 
limit orders from the other side of the market are defined as "market orders".  From a 
technical point of view, however, the forms and language used in placing the orders is the 
same for both types of orders.7   
All trading took place in an experimental currency called francs, where each franc 
was worth $0.001.  In every first period of a year, each subject was given an initial fixed 
endowment of 10 assets and 8000 francs, the latter as a loan that had to be repaid after each 
year.  We did not allow subjects to go short in either asset or cash.  After each year, the state 
of nature was revealed and earnings were recorded as number of assets times the dividend 
plus francs on hand minus the francs given as a loan. 
                                                 
6 Gul and Postlewaite (1992), p. 1280 [29]. 
7 During the experiment we had the trades and orders under surveillance. In 040527, we discovered that two 
subjects combined to make three self-trades early in a period to manipulate prices. We announced publicly that 
these were self-trades and that it was not allowed.    
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Once assembled at the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political 
Science, instructions were read out load and the use of Marketscape was briefly explained.  
The tree contained in Figure 1 was common knowledge and was presented to subjects along 
with the instructions that can be viewed in the appendix.  During the experiment, the 
binomial tree in Figure 1 was drawn on the board for each period.  In year 1 of all 
experimental series there was a public announcement of the actual draw from the previous 
round, the draw was written in the binomial tree after the announcement each period.  In 
subsequent years, the information distributed at the nodes differed according to the 
experimental design discussed below.  The market was opened for trading for a fixed length 
of time, five minutes per period, and was then closed in preparation for the upcoming period.  
If the period past was the third and thus final period of a year, the dividend was paid and 
subjects updated their earnings and waited for the first period of the next year. 
Each experimental session followed an identical procedure.  At the beginning of each 
session, a practice year was conducted as part of the instructions.  The procedures used in the 
practice year were the same as those used in Series One (Symmetric Information).  The 
purpose of the training session was to familiarize the subjects with the structure of the 
experiment and introduce them to the software used.  There was no payment in the practice 
year and the data from these are not included in any of the results.  
The first year of each of the five sessions was conducted under the conditions of 
Series One (Symmetric Information).  Following the first year of each session, three years 
(three periods each) were conducted under the conditions of Series Two (Asymmetric 
Information).  Thus, the aggregated data for all sessions consists of five years (fifteen 
periods) under the conditions of Series One (Symmetric Information) and fifteen years (forty-
five periods) under the conditions of Series Two (Asymmetric Information). 
Belief information was collected after each period of Series Two (Asymmetric 
Information).  After having seen their own private information for the previous period, 
conducted trades and observed the trades of others during the period, subjects were asked to 
place a bet on whether the draw of the previous period was up or down.  The subjects had the 
choice of betting $0, $0.25 or $0.50 at odds 2:1.  These were collected after each year before 
the announcement of the state of nature and were added to the earnings at the end of the 
experiment.  Both informed and uninformed were asked to place a bet.  We used these to 
determine the beliefs and degree of confidence of the subjects.  It is noteworthy, that no 
single subject made negative earnings on the betting.  
4. Economic Models and Theory 
In this section, competing models are outlined and applied to the experimental 
environment introduced above.  The models provide tools through which patterns of data can 
be identified and interpreted.  
Reflecting a diverse evolution, theory consists of a broad spectrum of models that 
range from those based on different principles of equilibrium to models that are very 
specialized and built on different axioms about individual behavior.  Wee focus on two 
classes of models and inquire about the insights they provide about the behavior observed in 
the experimental markets.  Equilibrium models have typically evolved through classical 
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economics, sometimes modified by insights from game theory.  Markets with imperfect 
competition in the information structure have evolved through the finance literature from a 
background of models specialized for applications in asset markets and markets reflecting 
organized securities markets.  
Equilibrium 
 
Three different equilibrium models are prominent in the literature.  Two of these are included 
primarily for orientation and completeness of the discussion.  The first of these three models, 
the No Trade Theorem, is important because much theory is developed from the hypothesis 
that it is reliable.  It is important to notice that this theory predicts that no trade will take 
place in any of the markets studied here.  The second of the three, The Fully Revealing 
Rational Expectation Equilibrium, is the central focus of the study.  The last of the three 
models, the Private Information Equilibrium is important as a baseline against which one can 
compare information aggregation in markets.  It is, in a sense, a compromise between the 
other two so it should be considered regardless of its role as a baseline. 
Game Theory: The No Trade Theorem (NTT).  The model predicts that no trade will take 
place. 
Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the markets are a zero sum game; the asset 
has the same value to all parties as does the money.  If information about the value of the 
asset is known to one party and not the other and this pattern of knowledge is public, then 
game theory predicts that no trade will take place due to the strategic position in which all 
agents find themselves.  The basic principle is a No Trade Theorem that holds that no agent 
will trade with an agent with more information, and if both agents have the same 
information, there are no gains from trade.  Thus, according to the model the system is at 
equilibrium when no trade takes place in either Series One (Symmetric Information) or 
Series Two (Asymmetric Information). 
Fully Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium (RE).  The fully revealing Rational 
Expectations equilibrium model holds that all information available to the market will be 
immediately incorporated into the price. 
In Series One (Symmetric Information), markets are open for period one without any 
information about the state made available to the agents.  They know only that the state is 
distributed as described in Section 2 and Section 3 above.  Without additional information, 
the asset has an expected va lue of 500.  Agents know that at the end of the period, one of the 
extremes states will be removed as a possibility and with this revelation the expected value 
will become either 400 or 600 with a 50:50 chance of each.  Thus, the model predicts that 
prices will be at the expected value given previously announced draws starting at 500 in 
period 1 then moving to either 400 or 600 for period 2 and then moving up or down by 100 
from there, depending on the announced draw. 
In Series Two (Asymmetric Information), information about one event (the 
elimination of one of the extremes, 200 or 800, as a possible value of the asset) is given to a 
subset of individual before the opening of period one.  The information allows those with it 
to adjust the expected value of the asset to either 600 or 400.  The model holds that this 
information will be reflected by the price that emerges in period 1.  That is, the price will be 
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either 600 or 400 during period 1.  Before the opening of period 2, a different subset of 
agents is told which of the extremes that remains, the high or the low, can be removed.  So, if 
800 were announced as removed from possibility in period 1, the new information would 
reveal that either 600 or 200 can be removed as a possibility.  If 200 was announced as 
removed from possibility in period 1 then in period 2 the new information, when combined 
with the information revealed in period 1 would allow either 800 or 400 to be removed as a 
possibility leaving the expected value given all information to be either 400 or 600.  
According to the model, prices in a period will be the expected value of the asset given all 
information that was available to the market at the start of the period. 
Private Information Equilibrium (PI).  The model holds that the price of the asset will reflect 
the maximum expected value based on the private information alone held by agents. 
It is important to note that private information in Series Two (Asymmetric 
Information) has two components, a time component and a state elimination component.  The 
state elimination component allows the holder to eliminate only one of the two states 800 or 
200 in the absence of any other information.  In the absence of the information that became 
available in the earlier period, the expected value based on private information alone is either 
400 or 600 and nothing else, regardless of the time of the information.  The information 
becomes more powerful given the information that was from the previous period due to the 
conditioning on the time component.  For example, agents with information in the third 
period know the state with certainty if they know the information available in the first two 
periods. 
 In Series One (Symmetric Information), the predictions of the PI and the Rational 
Expectations are the same.  In Series Two (Asymmetric Information), the model predicts 
only prices of 400 or 600, which are the only expected values that can be calculated from 
private information alone.  Unless budget constraints intervene, the price will be the expected 
value of the agent with the highest expected value that exists in the market at the time.  For 
example, if the private information is up in the first period, a price of 600 will emerge for the 
period, pushed there as the informed agents buy from the uninformed.  However, if the 
private information is down, the price will be 500, as the uninformed buy from the informed.  
If the information is up for each of the three periods, the price will be 600 and if the 
information is down for each of the three periods, the price will be 400 and get there through 
a path of 500 for the first and second periods.   
 
Information Micro Structure: Competition, Imperfect Competition and Information 
Revelation 
A class of models initiated by Kyle (1985, 1989) [34, 35] and modified and 
generalized by Foster and Viswanathan (1996) [25], Dutta and Madhavan (1993) [20] and 
Back (2000, 2004) [6, 7] extends the theory to central aspects of a price discovery process.  
The models themselves rest on forms of imperfect competition in the revelation of 
information to the market.  Traders can anticipate the market reaction to the information they 
reveal and thus, in light of possible competition from other traders who have the same or 
similar information, trade with the realization that they will have an impact.  The principle at 
work is monopoly or monopolistic competition in which information is the valuable resource 
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that receives the rents from imperfect competition and the rents accrue to informed traders.  
In a manner similar to the way that the distribution of demand and supply functions shape the 
outcome in a world of imperfect competition, the distribution of information shapes the 
outcome in a market with a potential for information aggregation. 
Application of the micro structure models to the experimental environments here 
requires interpretations.  First, the micro structure models distinguish between limit orders 
and markets orders.  In the experimental environment, limit orders are those that reside in the 
book.  Market orders, though technically limit orders, never enter the book because they are 
crossed immediately with the other side of the market.  That is, a market order is the 
acceptance of an offer that was first made by the other side of the market.  Thus for purposes 
of analysis, the offer expressed in an order is defined as a limit order and the acceptance, the 
order that subsequently creates a contract, is defined as a market order.  Second, the micro 
structure models rest on assumptions of three types of traders: noise traders, informed traders 
and market makers.  By contrast, the experimental markets have only two types of traders, 
informed and uniformed.  In the experimental markets, there is no special “market maker”.  
Thus, the behavior of the informed and the uniformed humans in the experimental markets 
are represented, respectively, by the informed and the noise traders of the model. 
 In the models, the noise traders typically have neither inside information nor pricing 
power and express their orders as market orders and exist only to prevent the model from 
becoming stuck at a no trade equilibrium.  Market makers, who are in the model to supply 
liquidity have no inside information but have some pricing power expressed in the terms of 
limit orders.  The behavior of insiders has been associated with both market orders and limit 
orders.  On one hand limit orders, the submission of a function to the market, can be viewed 
as revealing more information, as well as providing an option to an agent willing to trade 
against the order.  Thus, limit orders might be avoided by those with inside information.  On 
the other hand, the limit order suggests a bit of market power and the existence of monopoly 
rents resulting from pricing as opposed to rents to information.  Exactly why an insider 
would chose one form of order over another is not made clear in terms of theory and indeed it 
might make no difference at all in terms of existing models.  As an attempt to capture this 
open question a behavioral postulate is developed as the following axiom. 
The Informed Trader Competitive Hypothesis (ITCH):  The behavior of insiders and non 
insiders are indistinguishable in terms of timing and in terms of the use of limit orders and 
market orders. 
At the other extreme, is a case of a monopoly insider who has inside information and knows 
that no other trader has the information and anticipates the impact of orders on market prices.  
Of course, the behavioral concept is readily extended to perfect collusion among a set of 
insiders.  Kyle (1989) [35] develops the key model and demonstrates that some of the 
monopolist’s information never gets revealed to the market, so fully revealing Rational 
Expectations prices never emerge.  The basic behavioral postulate is captured by the 
following axiom. 
The Informed Trader Monopoly Hypothesis (ITMH):  The informed trader(s) submit limit 
orders that anticipate the information revelation effect on market price.  The information is 
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revealed slowly over time and the ultimate prices fall short of the fully revealing Rational 
Expectations. 
The case of multiple insiders who have the same (or similar) information was studied by 
Foster and Viswanathan (1996) [25] and generalized by Back, Cao, and Willard (2000) [7].  
Trading patterns in these models exhibit competition among the insiders.8  Intuitively, the 
first to trade does so before the information rents are dissipated by the information revealed 
in the orders of competitors.  Drawn by profits, the insiders thus “race” to trade.  That idea 
produces the following hypothesis about the behavior of insiders. 
The Informed Trader Rat Race Hypothesis (ITRRH):  Informed traders enter the market early 
in the trading period.  Over time, the information becomes fully incorporated (when all 
insiders have identical information) and fully revealing Rational Expectations are 
approached.  
A comment made now, with the benefit of the results to come, might serve to 
emphasize the delicate features of theory.  The rush of insiders to trade could be in 
anticipation of the price decreases that would result from the trading of other insiders. Thus, 
not only do existing profit potentials stimulate trading by the insiders, so also is the 
realization that the opportunity will be temporary, due to the oligopolistic responses of other 
insiders.  Since the uniformed have no incentive to rush, there will be no liquidity on the 
other side of the market that would facilitate successful market orders by the insiders.  Thus, 
competition among the insiders must take place in the form of limit orders as opposed to 
market orders.  Furthermore, it is only by placing orders that are more aggressive than those 
of others will an insider have the order exposed to the other side of the market.  Thus 
competition for access to the other side becomes an important force.  How that property 
becomes represented in the model is not always clear and whether or not such intuition 
follows directly from existing models seems to be subject to interpretation. 
A final postulate that has been used in this literature deals with the propensity of 
information to accumulate over time in the sense that in each period the new information is 
added to the old.  For the most part, the literature deals with environments in which the 
information is produced by some stationary stochastic process.  In the experiments, that is not 
the case.  When agents have information that is produced by different processes operating at 
different points in time one can imagine insiders exhibiting a tendency to wait until the end 
of the year to reveal what they know.  Or similarly one can imagine insiders using a strategy 
design to mislead and then profit from mislead future traders.  The following hypothesis is 
used to guide an inquiry about such possibilities. 
The Accumulated Information Hypothesis:  Newly arrived information becomes evaluated 
conditional on the past information as reflected in past prices.  Traders rely on information in 
past market prices and not only on their own information about the past when making current 
decisions. 
The behavioral literature contains many theories that suggest that the models above 
might not work.  For example, a “disposition effect” claims that investors have a bias 
towards selling former winners rather than losers, which empirically suggests that subjects 
                                                 
8 For an extension and review see Back (2004 [6]). 
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will have difficulty selling assets that have increased in price in the previous period.  Bad 
news would not become reflected in price if it follows good news.  The literature also 
suggests a prominence of mental accounting, which is a tendency to compartmentalize 
different types of events and worry about fluctuations in each one separately.  Over time, 
behaviour may not reflect the integration of experiences or reflect any overall learning and, if 
that is the case, information might not accumulate as suggested by the hypothesis. 
5. Measurement and Econometric Methods 
 
The data were explored with different econometric tools to control for robustness of 
our stated results.  We report two models and will refer to them as the AE Model and the 
AR1 Model.  From time to time throughout the paper, we will note if the choice between 
these two models might make a difference in the interpretation of the data.  For the most part, 
they tell us exactly the same thing. 
The Ashenfelter-El Gamal Model 
 
To assess the degree to which prices are converging to theoretical prediction, we use 
the following model attributed to Orley Ashenfelter and Mahmoud El Gamal (AE model) by 
Noussair, Plott and Riezman (1995) [39]. 
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where t is the time, Di are dummy variables, d1,i and d2,i are the coefficients to estimate and 
ei,t  is an i.i.d error term.  Variables Di take value 1 in period i, 0 otherwise.  
 
In this model, the estimated d1,i is a measure of the starting price (when t=1 all the weight is 
on the first term on the right side of above equation) as well as d2,i is an estimate of the limit 
of the price time series (for t ? 8  all the weight is on the second term on the right side of 
above equation).  For convenience, we will refer to this estimated limit as the AE eq. price.  
The concept of time used in the estimation of the equations was number of trades.  Other 
concepts of time, such as seconds, in periods of 30 seconds, and number of actions (bids, 
asks and trades) were tested and number of trades seemed to be the best for an overall 
integration of results.  
The AR1 Model 
 
In addition to the AE model, we use the following autoregressive model of order 1: 
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where Di are dummy variables defined as in the previous model, t is the time and ei,t is an 
i.i.d error term.  With the estimated coefficients, we can compute the estimated limit of the 
time series as the stationary price of the autoregressive model in the following way: 
 
r-
=
1
i
i
d
P  
 
We will refer to this as the AR1 eq price. Finally,  to check if the prices converge to prices 
predicted by theory under the hypothesis of information aggregation, we compute intervals of 
confidence (at 95% level) of the estimated stationary price, AR1 eq. price, and check if the 
theoretical price is within this interval or out.  To build these intervals, we need the variance 
of P  that we compute using the delta method. 
 
To estimate both models, we use the Cochrane-Orcutt transformed regression estimator that 
permits consistent estimation in the presence of first-order-serially-correlated residuals.  In 
detail, we use a search method to estimate the value of the autoregressive coefficient ? that 
minimizes the sum of squared errors of the transformed equation.   
 
6. Results 
 
 All periods of all experiments were studied with both the AE model and the AR1 
model and the estimates from the two models are contained in Table 2.  An AR2 model was 
also used but none of the conclusions below are changed if it is used.  The table contains 
estimates of the convergence price, the Rational Expectations price prediction, and the 
Rational Expectations predicted movement from the previous period. Periods are classified as 
a full convergence to the Rational Expectations price, a bubble, a mirage or a period of no 
movement.  Confidence intervals and other measurements are also included in the table.  For 
the most part, the AE model and the AR1 model paint very similar pictures of the behaviour 
of the markets but there are slight differences as will be illustrated in the pages that follow 
and we want to make sure that they reader does not become confused. 
 The results are partitioned into two subsections.  The first section addresses market 
performance and model accuracy using traditional market measures in addition to the new 
data on beliefs produced by the betting data.  The fundamental message of the section is that 
price data and belief data strongly support the Rational Expectations class of theories but 
there are notable exceptions.  Both bubbles and mirages can be observed in these markets and 
the analysis is focused in part on their definition and characterisation.  The second section 
turns to the process through which information aggregation occurs in markets.   
Market Performance and Model Accuracy  
The time series of all years of Series One (Symmetric Information) for all 
experiments are shown in Figure 2 in relation to the expected value of the asset (fifteen 
periods).  Similarly the time series for all periods of all years of all experiments of Series 
Two Asymmetric Information) are shown in Figure 3 in relation to the expected value of the 
asset given the aggregate of private information held by individuals, which is the prediction 
of the fully revealing Rational Expectations model (forty-five periods). 
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The first question posed is whether or not the markets studied here have a tendency to 
converge to the fully revealing Rational Expectations equilibrium.  Do prices tend to reflect 
the aggregate of information available to all participants to date?  The two different series are 
reviewed.  Result 1 deals with Series One (Symmetric Information).  These markets are of 
interest as a baseline of assessing the capacity of markets to adjust to new information.  
Verification of such capacities is needed because of reports of bubbles, speculation, 
confusion and other phenomena that can intervene during market adjustments.  Result 2 deals 
with the Series Two (Asymmetric Information).  In Series Two (Asymmetric Information) 
the information aggregation becomes important. 
RESULT 1.  In Series One (Symmetric Information), prices converge to the fully revealing 
Rational Expectations equilibrium (the risk neutral expected value given all information 
available to the market). 
SUPPORT. 
The price is converging to the expected value at the 95% confidence level in 10 of the 15 
periods when the AE model is used.  This can be observed in Table 2 where the column 
conv. indicates whether the price has converged (marked with a 1) or not (marked with a 0).  
The number of periods is 11 out of 15 when the AR1 model is used and the number of 
periods for which either the AE or the AR1 model is not significantly different is 11 out of 15 
periods.  The two models thus give almost the same result. Three of the four periods in which 
the difference is not significant are first periods and this failure of significance is with no 
doubt related to the very small variance of prices.  Measuring how the direction of prices 
change in response to new information gives even stronger support for the Rational 
Expectations model.  Using this criterion (columns emp. mov. in table 2) in the Series One 
(Symmetric Information) markets, the movement was correct in all cases and significant in 
all 10 instances for the AR1 model and 9 out of 10 for the AE model. Only 040513-1-29 is 
not significant, but still correct in the AE model. Ñ 
RESULT 2.  In Series Two (Asymmetric Information), the Rational Expectations is much 
better than the alternative Private Information model.  In most periods, prices either move in 
the direction of or converge close to the fully revealing Rational Expectations equilibrium. 
SUPPORT. 
We skip any detailed comparisons between the Private Information model and the fully 
revealing Rational Expectations model since it is an exercise in the obvious.  We turn 
instead, to an evaluation of the fully revealing Rational Expectations model.  The data are 
contained in Table 2.  Viewing intra period transactions with the AE model, the markets 
attain the fully revealing Rational Expectations expected value in 28 out of the 45 periods in 
Series Two (Asymmetric Information, column conv. is a 1 in Table 2). Using the AR1 model 
the markets attain the fully revealing Rational Expectations in 24 out of 45 periods in Series 
Two (Asymmetric Information, column conv. is a 1 in Table 2).  These are where the result is 
significant using a confidence interval of 95% for both models.  Viewed another way, in 31 
                                                 
9 Throughout we will use the notation session-year-period when denoting a particular period or year in a certain 
session. 
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of 45 periods either the AE or the AR1 model says that the data are converging to the fully 
revealing Rational Expectations equilibrium in Series Two (Asymmetric Information).  
 A second method of testing asks if the markets move in the direction of the fully 
revealing Rational Expectations equilibrium given the new information that is made available 
to the market. The tests ask: (i) is the movement of prices in the direction of the fully 
revealing Rational Expectations equilibrium and (ii) is the difference in price significantly 
different from the prices in the previous period.  Basically, the model requires that a 
statistically significant movement exists in the direction predicted by the model.  In the first 
period, the convention asks that the movement be different from the expected value of 500, 
then plus or minus 100 depending on the movement being up or down.  The condition is met 
in 35 out of 45 periods using the AE model, and in 38 out of 45 periods using the AR1 
model.  The null hypothesis that the direction of movements is equally likely is rejected at 
confidence levels of 1%.Ñ 
 Clear exceptions exist to the Rationa l Expectations convergence process reported in 
Result 2.  These require examination and in doing so we define two different types of 
phenomena.  A bubble is identified as a period in which the market moves in a direction 
opposite to the direction indicated by the newly arrived information and simultaneously that 
the direction is opposite to the direction dictated by the aggregation of all information 
available to the market.  A mirage is equilibration to the wrong equilibrium and we adopt the 
convention that the final trades in a period are not on or very near the right equilibrium, a 
phenomenon that is symptomatic but might be insufficient to show up in the statistics.  A 
mirage is typically consistent with a (potential) Rational Expectations of previous prices, 
which have moved near a wrong state so the movements in the mirage periods are in the 
"right" direction.  Basically, a mirage is most easily identified when there was a bubble 
somewhere in the past.  The third phenomena of note are periods of non-movement of prices 
from one period to the next.  It is similar to a sluggish price adjustment sometimes observed 
in markets.  These periods are 040513-3-2 and 040527-3-2.  For purpose of analysis, we 
group periods into "bubble periods", "mirage periods" and "non-bubble-mirage periods". 10 
RESULT 3. Bubbles and Mirages can be observed in the markets. 
SUPPORT.  
 As identified in Table 2 (by viewing the column bubble where a 1 appears), three 
periods of bubbles can be identified in the markets.  These are 040506-3-1, 040506-4-1 and 
040527-2-2.  It should be noted that in 040527-2-2, the movement using the AR1 model is 
consistent with our definition of a bubble, but it is not significant at a 95% level.  We choose 
to still treat it as a bubble as it is supported by the AE model, where it is a bubble and 
significant at a 95% level.  In all of the three cases with bubbles, the market moved against 
the information contained in the just arrived private information and in all cases the market 
moved against the direction dictated by all information available to the market.  In this 
respect, it should be noticed that in session 040506 the just arrived information was all 
information in the market because the bubbles occurred in the first period.  The event in 
                                                 
10 We also studied separately the periods that tightly converged to the fully revealing Rational Expectations 
equilibrium. Splitting these periods out for study produced no additional results and changed none of the results 
that follow. 
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session 040527 is different, however, because the bubble occurred in the second period and 
thus first period information existed in addition to the second period information.  
 Using Table 2 (by viewing the column mirage where a 1 appears), four examples of 
mirages exist in the data using the AR1 model11. 040506-3-2, 040506-3-3 both adjust to 
levels that would be consistent with their fully revealing Rational Expectations equilibria, 
had the information available in the first period been accurately reflected in the market.  
040506-4-2 is similarly a convergence to the "wrong" price due to an earlier incorrect pricing 
of the asset.  The phenomenon can be seen again in 040527-2-3 in which the incorrect 
adjustment in 040527-2-2 causes 040527-2-3 to converge to a wrong equilibrium but is a 
correct fully revealing Rational Expectations equilibrium given prices in 040527-2-2. Ñ 
 The next result, Result 4, provides a connection with price discovery and beliefs as 
contained in patterns of betting.  Recall that individuals had the option of placing bets of 
various sizes on the changes of expected state (up or down) as reflected in the market 
responses to the information that was placed in the market in the previous periods.  These 
bets are interpreted as beliefs.  In particular, the size of the bet is interpreted as reflecting 
confidence in a belief.  Confidence is defined as the percentage of actual betting amount 
relative to the maximum amount possible to bet by uniformed individuals.  Accordingly, if 
all uninformed bet $0.50, the confidence is 100%.  Likewise, if all uninformed choose to bet 
$0, the confidence is 0%.  
Figure 4 contains summaries of the data used in Result 4 stated below.  Figure 4 
shows the percentage of bets that were placed on the correct state and the degree of 
confidence in those bets.  The data are from the bubble periods, the mirage periods and the 
remaining periods as a group.  For analytical purposes, only the bets placed by the 
uninformed are considered as all bets placed by informed were correct and placed on the full 
amount of $0.50.    
RESULT 4. Ex post belief formations of the uninformed are consistent with a Rational 
Expectations interpretation of market prices.  (i) Information is aggregated (except in periods 
with bubbles) as reflected in correct and strongly held beliefs.  (ii) In periods with bubbles, 
beliefs are incorrect, but held with strong confidence.  (iii) Beliefs lack some confidence 
during the mirage periods as compared to other periods.  
SUPPORT. 
 Part (i). Of the uniformed people 84% place bets on the correct state is 307 out of a 
total number of 354 made by the uninformed in all five sessions.  However, the proportion of 
correct bets differs dramatically across sessions and periods according to the existence of a 
bubble or not.  In 040505, only 2 out of 78 bets were wrong.  Overall, 18 out of 20 bets made 
by the uninformed in the three bubble periods were wrong.  If the bubble periods are 
                                                 
11 The classification of periods into mirages is somewhat sensitive to the econometric model used to estimate 
price movements.  The classification we use in the support is a result of the AR1 model.  If we use the 
Ashenfelter-El Gamal model periods 040404-3-2 and 040506-2-2 will be added as mirages and 040506-3-3 is 
not classified as a mirage.  Such additions would be questionable because they do reach the Rational 
Expectations equilibrium on the final trades and the deletion would be questionable because prices move in the 
direction of two Rational Expectations equilibria but do not fully adjust to either, but remain a long dis tance 
from the actual Rational Expectations for the period. 
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removed from the overall sample, only 29 of 334 bets are placed on the wrong draw.  
Basically, less than 1 in 10 (8.7%) of the bets placed by uninformed people was wrong for 
the non bubble periods, but during a bubble almost all are wrong (90%).  A test on the 
difference between the two proportions of error (8.7% in non bubble periods and 90% in the 
bubble periods) leads to a rejection of the hypothesis of no difference of the proportions at a 
1% level of confidence.  
 Part (ii).  In the three periods where a bubble is observed (040506-3-1, 040506-4-1 
and 040527-2-2), the average betting confidence is 85%.  So there is no evidence in the 
betting behavior that the market senses that it is in a bubble.  Contrary, subjects are actually 
placing stronger bets ex post during a bubble than in other periods. 
 Part (iii).  A simple average (not weighted by the number of subjects) of the betting 
confidence overall is 80%.  In the four periods where a mirage is observed (040506-3-2, 
040506-3-3, 040506-4-2 and 040527-2-3) the average betting confidence is 73%.  This is 
reflected in Figure 4.  This suggests that the market senses something wrong in mirage 
periods.  There is thus an interesting difference in the betting behavior compared to the 
bubble periods which we will turn our attention to next. Ñ 
The Part (ii) of the above result have particularly strong implications since the bets 
are made ex post to the period and all bids, asks and trades have been observed.  When the 
market is truly wrong as in the case bubble, it has no idea that it is wrong.  This belief does 
not reveal a bubble. By contract, the relatively low level of confidence could be an indication 
that a mirage is generally unstable whereas a bubble, at least in the short run, is stable since 
the uninformed do not detect it.  
 Natural questions to pose are related to experience and learning.  We have no special 
models with which to explore the possibilities but do offer an observation.  As stated in the 
observation below confidence in beliefs become stronger with experience.  
OBSERVATION 1.  The level of bets increases slightly in the later periods. 
SUPPORT.  
There is an increase in the amounts that the uninformed bet.  It is accompanied by an increase 
in confidence of bets as depicted in Figure 5.  If the data behind this figure are aggregated, a 
simple average confidence (not weighted by the number of subjects in each session) rises 
from 73% in the first year of all Series Two (Asymmetric Information) to 78% in the 
following year and 89% in the last year.  There is thus an indication that the strength of 
beliefs may increase with experience. Ñ    
Together Result 4 and Observation 1 indicate that the Accumulated Information Hypothesis 
receives support in these markets.  Beliefs are based on market price and are accurate.  The 
information accumulates across time.  Individuals add information contained in past prices to 
the newly arrived private information confidence in the information increases with time.  The 
process of balancing private information with the information contained in prices as implied 
by the hypothesis seems to be taking place. 
The Process of Information Aggregation (The Market Micro-Structure) 
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 This section begins with a statement of a possibly important discovery that we will 
call The Fundamental Coordination Principle of Information Transfer in Competitive 
Markets.  The fact that markets have the capacity to solve complex problems of aggregation 
motivates a question of how it happens.  Our attempts to answer the question lead to the 
discovery. 12  Result 5 is a statement of the fundamental principle and Result 6 demonstrates 
that bubbles and mirages are related to the instances in which it fails. 
RESULT 5. The Fundamental Coordination Principle of Information Transfer in Competitive 
Markets.  Informed traders initiate action early in a market period and do so by placing limit 
orders.  The uniformed enter after the informed and do so with market orders as opposed to 
limit orders.  Such tendencies tend to dissipate later in the period. 
SUPPORT  
Measurement in support of Result is restricted to actual contracts as opposed to tenders that 
do not make a market.  Support for Result 5 can be seen in Figure 6.  In the aggregate, it is 
not the case that the information of the trader dictates whether a limit order or market order is 
tendered.  This is defined by using the ratio of contracts with a limit order placed by an 
informed subject to contracts with a limit order placed by an uninformed subject.  Overall, 
this ratio is 0.69 (see Table 3).  But if we look at the micro structure, an interesting fact 
appears and supports Result 5.  The overall ratio starts out being high in the first minute (1.34 
on average, see the overall line in Figure 5 and minute 1 in Table 3) of a period, then drops to 
0.69 and 0.73 by the second and third minute and decreases to near the expected number of 
0.50 by the fourth minute (0.49) and 0.59 in period five.  The expected ratio of 0.50 appears 
as there are app. 1/3 informed and 2/3 uninformed subjects in the Series Two (Asymmetric 
Information) case. Ñ 
Result 5 provides a clear connection between observation and theory. 13  The next observation 
summarizes that connection. 
                                                 
12 An instant of the principle is clearly evident in the first experiments dealing with information aggregation by 
Plott and Sunder (1982) [45] who reported that informed traders were in markets early that the information they 
held tended to be revealed by the bids and asks. 
13 The central property identified in the result was first reported in Plott and Sunder (1982) [45] (see their p.687 
and Table 8).  On the surface, Result 5 might appear to be inconsistent with results reported in Bloomfield, et.al. 
(forthcoming) [8] but that is not the case.  Markets in Bloomfield, et.al. implemented a feature of some financial 
markets in which the market opening is preceded by a pre-market market.  Thus, an opportunity existed for 
informed traders to submit limit orders.  No doubt, this period of "cheap talk" contributed to the price discovery 
process just as it is supposed to do.  Thus the limit order activity took place in the pre-market market.  While the 
overall pattern of results seems consistent in the light of this difference, other features of the Bloomfield, et.al. 
paper could serve to create differences.  In particular, the time periods were very short relative to experience in 
experimental markets and expected volume, especially in light of the fact that in their software, orders were 
restricted to single units only, which is known to increase the time required for markets to properly clear. Short 
time periods have long been identified as a source of alteration to market convergence processes (Plott, 1983) 
[41].  The one unit per order constraint could also have implications for the interaction between traders and the 
book, due to queues at a price in the book and the time priority of execution.  Also important is the fact that the 
Bloomfield, et.al.  markets had only two insiders thereby creating incentives to collude that often appear as 
market signals in bids and asks and would cloud any analysis of instrument use.  Finally, the use of penalties as 
an incentive for liquidity trades creates the equivalent of a short sale squeeze that is known to have the capacity 
to disrupt th
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Observation 2.  Among the models of market micro structure as applied to these markets, the 
ITRRH receives support while ITCH and ITMH do not. 
 The failure of the Fundamental Coordination Principle can be directly associated with 
the instances and periods in which the fully revealing Rational Expectations model fails in 
the data.  We will define Coordination Reversals to be instances in which the fundamental 
coordination principle does not hold.  That is, coordination reversals are instances in which 
uninformed behave as informed by entering the market early, placing limit orders.14  The 
following result summarizes the data. 
RESULT 6:  The Coordination Reversal phenomenon is present in periods where the fully 
revealing Rational Expectations equilibrium is not reached.  That is, during non-bubble-
mirage periods the tendency is for the informed to place limit orders in the first trades but 
during the bubble and mirage periods the uninformed place limit orders in the first trades.  
SUPPORT:  
The following results are supported by data summarized in Table 4, Table 5 and can be 
viewed graphically in Figure 6.  The result can be seen by comparing the ratio of limit orders 
in the trades during each minute of the periods where the fully revealing Rational 
Expectations equilibrium is reached as compared to the periods where there is either a bubble 
or a mirage.  Using Table 4 for the non-bubble-mirage periods, the ratio of limit orders 
placed by informed subjects to limit orders placed by uninformed subjects is 1.56 in the first 
minute and 0.71 in the second minute (0.76, 0.55 and 0.67 in the third, fourth and fifth 
minutes respectively).  By comparison, using Table 5 (the column ratio for informed to 
uninformed) for the bubble and mirage periods, the ratio of contracts with informed people 
placing the limit order to uniformed is 0.56 in the first minute and 0.57 in the second minute 
(0.56, 0.18 and 0.19 in the third, fourth and fifth minutes respectively).  Thus, during the 
bubble and mirage periods, the informed traders are less aggressive, revealing less relative to 
uniformed agents, during the first minutes of trading, as compared to the non-bubble-mirage 
periods.  In a statistical sense, we get three supportive results that are significant at a 95% 
confidence level.  (1) There is a tendency for informed to trade with limit orders in the first 
minute of non-bubble-mirage periods, whereas there is a tendency for uninformed to trade 
with limit orders in bubble and mirage periods.  This can be seen from Tables 4 and 5.  In 
periods with bubbles or mirages, the Chi2 test rejects the null hypothesis of independence 
between time and the proportion of limit orders by informed or uniformed agents (See Table 
5).  The interpretation is that the proportion of insiders doesn’t depend on time in the bubble 
and mirage periods.  Contrary, the Chi2 test for independence is rejected in Table 4.  The 
interpretation is that the proportion of insiders does depend on time in the non-bubble-mirage 
periods, meaning that they trade with limit orders early.  (2) It is supported by the notion of 
the probit test in Table 6 (part b).  This shows a negative (and significantly different from 
zero) correlation with time in the non-bubble-mirage periods of minus 0.0020365.  The 
                                                                                                                                                       
of the differences, the Bloomfield, et al., data suggest that the Fundamental Coordinating Principle operated in 
their markets as well as ours. 
14  The property of coordination failures appear to be similar to phenomenon identified in cascades (Hung and 
Plott (2001) [31]).  Individuals add information revealed by the actions of others to their own information but 
do so with less weight then suggested by Bayes Law.  When the information is misleading, the information 
aggregated is itself wrong.  
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interpretation is that the more time that goes by, the less likely is an informed to trade using 
limit orders in the non-bubble-mirage periods.  (3) By the second minute the difference in the 
bubble and mirage contra non-bubble-mirage periods is no longer significant.  This is shown 
in Table 7 that shows the statistical test on the difference of the bubble or mirage and non-
bubble-mirage periods as illustrated by the p-value of 0.038698 in the first minute as appears 
in the last column.  
These statistical tests emphasize that in the non-bubble-mirage periods, information is 
revealed in limit orders early.  As mentioned earlier this corresponds to the findings of Plott 
and Sunder (1982) [45] (see their Table 8 and discussion at p.687). Ñ  
 We do not know if coordination failures are a cause or a symptom of the failure of the 
fully revealing Rational Expectations to develop.  Two other phenomena tend to be present 
as well during the bubble periods.  Information traps 15 are situations in which some agent is 
unable to profit on private information due to a lack of funds (a cash constraint and no 
borrowing power) and/or a lack of units to sell (a no short sale constraint).  In such events, 
the information held by the agent is "trapped" in the sense that the market process permits no 
avenue through which the privately held information can enter the market.  Another 
phenomenon is confusion or misunderstanding.  In the context of the experiments studied 
here, confusion is present when a person does not act on (or acts contrary to) private 
information when it is profitable and when the person is not constrained to do otherwise. 
RESULT 7: In all three instances of bubbles, information traps possibly in connection with 
confusion contribute to the creation of the bubble. 
SUPPORT.  
In 040506-3-1, two of the three informed people sold out #123 and #129 and the third person 
who was informed was confused, # 126, selling one unit and holding nine but betting 
correctly with confidence (i.e. the full amount).  So, the system was in a combination of 
confusion and an information trap.  Two of the three informed people had no more units to 
sell and thus could not get the information into the market while the third was confused.  The 
confusion of #126, as opposed to some sort of expectation, is documented through behavior 
in other periods.  Specifically in 040506-2-3, this subject decreased holdings on positive 
information, again betting correctly the full amount. 
In 040506-4-1, all three informed people had sold out (3 122, #125 and # 128) so the 
system was in an information trap. 
In 040527-2-2, one of the informed spends everything and is at the boundary so this 
person is trapped (#122 buys up and is caught on the cash constraint).  The other two 
informed individuals make no trades at all, but they do bet properly (# 125, #128).  The two 
"confused" people exhibit unusual behaviors in other parts of the experiment.  In 040527-3-3, 
#125 should sell but does nothing and in 040527-4-1 should buy and does not change 
holdings.  In 040527-3-3, #128 should sell, but buys heavily and 040527-4-1 should buy and 
does so. Ñ 
                                                 
15 The concept of an information trap is introduced by Camerer, Noeth, Plott and Weber (1999) [11]. 
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7. Conclusions 
Two important lessons emerge from the experiments and analysis. The first is that 
assets can integrate information that arrives over time.  The price of the option is observed 
adjusting substantially as predicted by a Rational Expectations model.  The second and 
perhaps the most important lesson of the research is the picture of how information finds its 
way into a market together with the circumstances that accompany the failure of information 
aggregation.  The picture rests on the discovery (Result 5) of a behavioral property that we 
call The Fundamental Coordination Principle of Information Transfer in Competitive 
Markets.  The phenomenon is clearly suggested by the Informed Trader 'Rat Race' 
Hypothesis (ITRRH).  However, the details of the underlying forces at work are still a 
mystery.  Two candidate theories are evident at the moment.  One is in the spirit of the 
market micro structure literature and holds that imperfect competition among informed 
traders is at the heart of the process.  The other rests on informationally small agents (or 
agents who act as if they are informationally small), who do not attempt to hide their private 
information but nevertheless rush to trade and take advantage of the profits suggested by 
their private information and in doing so collectively reveal what they know.  Regardless of 
the underlying economics, failure of the operation of the principle, accompanied or caused by 
confused agents and buttressed by information traps account for incomplete or incorrect 
information transfer and aggregation failure with resulting bubbles and mirages.  
The picture begins with the fact that there is little if any support for the No Trade 
Theorem.  It is included here only for completeness.  A long history of experimental research 
in economics and finance demonstrates a natural tendency toward trade.  The theoretical 
invention of “noise” traders is a natural tool with which to capture this inexplicable tendency, 
thereby preventing the model from becoming “stuck” at a no trade equilibrium.  Separate 
incentives for agents to provide "liquidity" are not really necessary in markets because people 
naturally bring a propensity to trade with them.  The picture continues with the important fact 
that a tendency exists for markets to collect and aggregate dispersed information, even when 
the information enters the market at different times.  The experiments provide much support 
for the equilibration principles that support a class of Rational Expectations models of 
markets and in particular demonstrate the relevance of the time structure of options pricing 
models.  That fact is the clear implication of Result 1 and Result 2.  However, bubbles and 
mirages in which the information transfer is incorrect or incomplete can occur (Result 3).  
Interestingly, the manifestation of Rational Expectations principles and the related 
importance of beliefs receive support from the application of a new methodology for 
collecting beliefs (Result 4).  
The process of information transfer and aggregation follows an identifiable path 
dependent, pattern.  The first to arrive in a market in time and in terms of commitment are 
those with the information.  That is the Fundamental Coordination Principle of Information 
Transfer in Competitive Markets.  The informed traders place limit orders early in the period 
and the uninformed traders, the "noise" traders, place market orders that cross with the 
informed traders (Result 5).  While in these markets the informed traders are informationally 
small, they behave much like competitors that compete with other informed traders for access 
to the uniformed and in doing so reveal what they know.  While the theoretical themes from 
the market microstructure literature do capture major patterns of what happens in the 
markets, the data exhibit clear cases in which the information does not become aggregated.  
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Both bubbles and mirages can be observed.  Bubbles exist when the current information 
accepted by the market is completely wrong and mirages exist when current information is 
accepted correctly but all information available is no t, causing the markets to converge to the 
"wrong" equilibrium.  Because the failures of information aggregation are exceptions in the 
markets we study an opportunity to study the process of failure presented itself.  Such study 
reveals three different phenomena.  The first we call Coordination Reversals in which the 
uninformed are the first in the market.  This can happen extremely rapidly, within the first 
few seconds of a market.  The second is confusion exhibited when subjects either fail to act 
on their information at all or act in a manner inconsistent with their own interest.  The third 
are information traps, when occur when constraints of one form or another prevent an agent 
from acting on information.  These are studied in Result 6 and Result 7.  
 Once information is introduced into the market there is a "contagion" or "cascade" 
effect as the information implicit in the first few trades finds its way to the uninformed 
traders as a whole.  The behavior of informed and uninformed become indistinguishable. 
Learning then proceeds in a naturally understandable manner in which experience plays a 
role in organizing the natural and orderly introduction and transformation of information in 
the market. 
The process discovered would seem to depend heavily on the competitive nature of 
the markets.  The lack of information monopoly would also seem to be important together 
with public information about the nature of potential insider information. Finally, the process 
would seem to be very sensitive to the details of the market organization and the public 
information about the arrival of information.  The study of the implications of these variables 
must await another day. 
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8. Appendix 
 
A.1. Instructions  
 
General 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making.  The instructions 
are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a 
considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. 
In this experiment, we are going to conduct a market in which you will be a 
participant in a sequence of market years.  Each year consists of three periods.  The length of 
each period will be 5 minutes unless told otherwise.  You will be given a number of 
certificates that each will pay a liquidation dividend at the end of each year.  A certificate is 
thus a claim on a payment at the end of each year.  The markets for certificates have a one 
year (=three periods) life.  The dividend depends on the independent draws in the individual 
periods.  The attached information sheet will help determine the value to you of any decision 
you might make.  You are not to reveal this information to anyone.  It is your own private 
information. 
Specific Instructions  
The type of currency used in this market is francs.  All trading and earnings will be in terms 
of francs.  Each franc is worth _0.001_ dollars to you (i.e. _1000_ francs = $_1_). Do not 
reveal this number to anyone.  At the end of the experiment your francs will be converted to 
dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars.  Notice that the more francs you earn, the 
more dollars you will earn. 
At the beginning of a year, you will be given _10_ certificates and _8000_ francs (as a loan).  
Your profits come from two sources – from collecting liquidation dividends on all 
certificates you hold at the end of “Period 3” and from buying and selling certificates. During 
each market year, you are free to purchase or sell as many certificates as you wish.  
Determination of Draws  
The dividend you receive from the certificates you hold depends on the draws of the three 
periods.  In each of the three periods, the draw can be either up (U) or down (D).  The draw 
of each period will be random and determined before each year begins.  The draw will be 
made public after the corresponding period.  The draws were picked from a random table, 
which can be inspected by anyone after the experiment.  In all periods, the draws U and D are 
equally likely. 
To sum up - you will start every year (Period 1) with an initial endowment of certificates and 
an amount of francs given to you as a loan.  You may sell the certificates if you wish, you 
may hold them, or you may buy more.  If you hold a certificate at the end of the third period 
you receive the liquidation dividend X.  Your initial holding at the beginning of Period 2 
(and thereafter Period 3 etc.) is determined by your final holdings in Period 1 (and thereafter 
Period 2 etc.), i.e. your certificates and cash are carried over from period to period.  At the 
end of a year, you are free to keep all dividends plus your francs on hand minus the francs 
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given to you as a loan at the beginning of a year.  These are your profits for the year.  No 
short selling is allowed, i.e. you can only sell as many certificates as you have at any given 
time.  Communication not related to the trading is not allowed.  
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Figure 1: Time Structure of Periods for Information Revelation and 
Outcome Determination in an Experimental Year 
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FIGURE 2: SYMMETRIC INFORMATION PERIODS, 
FIRST YEAR ALL EXPERIMENTS, TRADING PRICE 
AND RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS PREDICTED PRICES 
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FIGURE 3: PRICE TIME SERIES, AND RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
PREDICTED PRICES, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, ALL PERIODS, ALL 
YEARS ALL EXPERIMENTS 
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Figure 4: Average Percentage of Bets Made on the Correct State 
and the Average Size of Bets as a Percent of the Maximum 
Possible(Confidence)
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Figure 5: Confidence in bets of uninformed 
subjects over all periods
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Figure 6: Ratio of informed to uninformed placing limit 
orders in each minute (aggregated)
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Table: 1: Experimental Conditions and Parameters 
 
Experiment Location Number 
of 
subjects 
Asset 
endow
ments 
Cash 
endow
ments 
Series Exchange rate Duration 
040504 Caltech 13 10 8000 One and Two 1000 francs = $1 2 hours 
040506 Caltech 10 10 8000 One and Two 1000 francs = $1 2 hours 
040513 Caltech 10 10 8000 One and Two 1000 francs = $1 2 hours 
040524 Caltech 17 10 8000 One and Two 1000 francs = $1 2 hours 
040527 Caltech 9 10 8000 One and Two 1000 francs = $1 2 hours 
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Table 2 Parameter Estimates and Tests from AE Model and the AR1 Model 
 
AE eq  price AR1 eq price 
session-year-period 
expected 
value 
R.E.theory
th. 
mov.a estimated 
price 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
conv.b emp.
c 
mov. bubble
d miragee no mov f 
Estimated 
price 
95% 
confidence 
interval 
conv. 
emp. 
mov. bubble mirage 
no 
mov. 
1 500  516.2 504.1 528.3 0     516.9 503.7 530 0     
2 600 100 601.6 587.1 616.1 1 85.4 0 0 0 598 583.3 612.7 1 81.1 0 0 0 1 
3 700 100 704.3 674.3 734.3 1 102.7 0 0 0 694.2 671.5 716.9 1 96.2 0 0 0 
1 600 100 612.3 591.2 633.4 1 112.3 0 0 0 610.8 592.2 629.3 1 110.8 0 0 0 
2 500 -100 513.9 474.9 552.9 1 -98.4 0 0 0 525.7 499.3 552 1 -85.1 0 0 0 2 
3 400 -100 442 417.4 466.7 0 -71.9 0 0 0 465.8 445.5 486.2 0 -59.9 0 0 0 
1 400 -100 397.5 374.8 420.2 1 -102.5 0 0 0 422.6 403.1 442.2 0 -77.4 0 0 0 
2 300 -100 157.2 81.3 233.1 0 -240.3 0 1 0 303.4 265.6 341.2 1 -119.2 0 0 0 3 
3 200 -100 230.5 196.7 264.4 1 73.3 0 0 1 222.4 198.1 246.7 1 -81 0 0 0 
1 600 100 613.1 596.4 629.7 1 113.1 0 0 0 607.4 591.4 623.5 1 107.4 0 0 0 
2 500 -100 507.6 480.6 534.6 1 -105.5 0 0 0 506.4 485 527.8 1 -101 0 0 0 
040505
4 
3 600 100 596.1 562.2 629.9 1 88.5 0 0 0 597.5 573.2 621.7 1 91.1 0 0 0 
1 500  496.9 479.4 514.4 1     516.3 499.7 532.9 1     
2 600 100 628.5 603.9 653.2 0 131.6 0 0 0 594.1 573.8 614.5 1 77.8 0 0 0 
040506
1 
3 500 -100 505.2 490.7 519.7 1 -123.4 0 0 0 503.1 488.4 517.8 1 -91 0 0 0 
 
     
a It is the theoretical size of the change in the price respect to the previous period (or respect 500 for period 1 Series Two, i.e. year 2,3,4)  
b 1 means that the expected value (theoretical prediction) is in the interval of confidence of the estimated  price 
c It is the empirical size of the change in the price respect to the previous period (or respect 500 for period 1 Series Two, i.e. year 2,3,4)  
d 1 means a bubble, which is a movement in the wrong direction and the interval of confidence of the estimated  price contains values that, in absolute value, 
differ at least of 100 from the correct equilibrium.   
e 1 means a mirage that is the interval of confidence of the estimated  price contains values that, in absolute value, differ at least of 100 from the correct 
equilibrium and the movement is in the right direction. 
f 1 means that there is not a statistical difference between the price of current period and that of the past period (or respect 500 for period 1 Series Two, i.e. year 
2,3,4). 
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1 600 100 593.4 577.6 609.3 1 93.4 0 0 0 562.6 546.9 578.2 0 62.6 0 0 0 
2 500 -100 440.8 394.5 487.1 0 -152.7 0 1 0 511.7 482.6 540.7 1 -50.9 0 0 0 2 
3 600 100 589.2 555.4 623 1 148.4 0 0 0 595.7 571.4 620 1 84.1 0 0 0 
1 400 -100 545.6 522.9 568.3 0 45.6 1 0 0 525.3 505.9 544.8 0 25.3 1 0 0 
2 300 -100 443.1 367.2 519 0 -102.5 0 1 0 439.6 402.6 476.7 0 -85.7 0 1 0 3 
3 200 -100 142.9 29.6 256.3 1 -300.1 0 0 0 295.5 249.1 341.8 0 -144.2 0 1 0 
1 400 -100 616.4 602.5 630.3 0 116.4 1 0 0 597.1 582.7 611.5 0 97.1 1 0 0 
2 500 100 686.9 659.9 713.9 0 70.5 0 1 0 696.1 674.7 717.6 0 99.1 0 1 0 
 
4 
3 600 100 577.4 560.8 594 0 -109.5 0 0 0 589.6 573.4 605.7 1 -106.6 0 0 0 
 
1 500  443.5 433.7 453.3 0     456.3 444.9 467.6 0     
2 400 -100 430.9 400.9 460.9 0 -12.6 0 0 1 428.1 405.4 450.8 0 -28.2 0 0 0 1 
3 300 -100 307.2 260.9 353.5 1 -123.7 0 0 0 317.7 289 346.4 1 -110.4 0 0 0 
1 600 100 598.3 573.7 622.9 1 98.3 0 0 0 566 545.6 586.4 0 66 0 0 0 
2 500 -100 454.4 378.5 530.3 1 -143.9 0 0 0 503.7 466.5 540.9 1 -62.3 0 0 0 2 
3 400 -100 397.6 370.6 424.6 1 -56.8 0 0 1 410.8 389.3 432.2 1 -92.9 0 0 0 
1 400 -100 416.8 383 450.7 1 -83.2 0 0 0 424 399.7 448.4 1 -76 0 0 0 
2 500 100 452.5 435.9 469.1 0 35.7 0 0 1 437.8 421.8 453.9 0 13.8 0 0 1 3 
3 600 100 568.2 548.5 587.9 0 115.7 0 0 0 535.3 517.4 553.3 0 97.5 0 0 0 
1 600 100 605.7 584.6 626.7 1 105.7 0 0 0 594 575.4 612.6 1 94 0 0 0 
2 500 -100 560.6 530.6 590.6 0 -45.1 0 0 0 539.4 516.6 562.1 0 -54.7 0 0 0 
040513
4 
3 600 100 600.9 487.5 714.3 1 40.3 0 0 1 596.9 551.5 642.3 1 57.5 0 0 0 
1 500  516.9 505.8 528 0     517.6 505.3 530 0     
2 600 100 603.5 592.7 614.3 1 86.6 0 0 0 602 589.9 614.2 1 84.4 0 0 0 1 
3 700 100 694.3 685.7 703 1 90.8 0 0 0 694.6 684.2 705 1 92.6 0 0 0 
1 600 100 597.9 587.4 608.4 1 97.9 0 0 0 588.5 576.6 600.5 1 88.5 0 0 0 
2 500 -100 499.4 487.7 511.2 1 -98.5 0 0 0 517 504.2 529.9 0 -71.5 0 0 0 2 
3 400 -100 399.1 382.5 415.7 1 -100.3 0 0 0 401.5 385.4 417.6 1 -115.5 0 0 0 
1 600 100 605.9 594.8 617 1 105.9 0 0 0 594 581.7 606.4 1 94 0 0 0 
2 700 100 689.7 678 701.5 1 83.8 0 0 0 678.5 665.6 691.3 0 84.4 0 0 0 3 
3 600 -100 605.1 580.5 629.7 1 -84.6 0 0 0 599.7 579.4 620.1 1 -78.7 0 0 0 
1 400 -100 412.6 403.1 422.2 0 -87.4 0 0 0 424.9 413.7 436.1 0 -75.1 0 0 0 
2 500 100 486 476.4 495.6 0 73.4 0 0 0 468.9 457.7 480.1 0 43.9 0 0 0 
040524
4 
3 600 100 613.6 583.6 643.6 1 127.6 0 0 0 582.8 560 605.6 1 113.9 0 0 0 
1 500  511.8 490.7 532.9 1     509.5 491 528.1 1     040527 1 
2 600 100 609.6 597.4 621.7 1 97.8 0 0 0 603.5 590.4 616.6 1 94 0 0 0 
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 3 500 -100 513.2 499.2 527.1 1 -96.4 0 0 0 510.3 496 524.7 1 -93.2 0 0 0 
1 600 100 606 583.3 628.7 1 106 0 0 0 590.3 570.9 609.6 1 90.3 0 0 0 
2 700 100 512.6 473.6 551.6 0 -93.5 1 0 0 559 532.6 585.4 0 -31.2 1 0 1 2 
3 800 100 632.1 612.3 651.8 0 119.5 0 1 0 603.5 585.6 621.4 0 44.4 0 1 0 
1 600 100 594.1 571.4 616.8 1 94.1 0 0 0 590.1 570.8 609.5 1 90.1 0 0 0 
2 500 -100 554.3 529.6 578.9 0 -39.8 0 0 0 568 547.6 588.3 0 -22.2 0 0 1 3 
3 400 -100 459.9 432.9 487 0 -94.3 0 0 0 450 428.5 471.4 0 -118 0 0 0 
1 600 100 597.3 578.8 615.9 1 97.3 0 0 0 579.5 562.3 596.7 0 79.5 0 0 0 
2 500 -100 498.5 441.2 555.8 1 -98.8 0 0 0 503.4 471.3 535.5 1 -76.1 0 0 0 
 
4 
3 400 -100 387.4 341.1 433.7 1 -111.1 0 0 0 418.6 389.8 447.5 1 -84.8 0 0 0 
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Table 3: Limit orders by informed and uninformed agents in all periods. 
 
Agents type  
Minute Uninformed Informed Total 
Ratio 
 informed to 
uninformed 
Test on  
independence 
1 41 55 96 1.34 
2 55 38 93 0.69 
3 79 58 137 0.73 
4 103 50 153 0.49 
5 95 56 151 0.59 
Total 373 257 630 0.69 
Pearson chi2(4) =  
15.9837    
Pr = 0.003 
 
Table 4: Limit orders by informed and uninformed agents in non-bubble-mirage periods  
Agents type 
Minute Uninformed Informed Total 
Ratio 
 informed to  
uninformed 
Test on  
independence 
1 32 50 82 1.56 
2 48 34 82 0.71 
3 70 53 123 0.76 
4 86 47 133 0.55 
5 79 53 132 0.67 
Total 315 237 552 0.75 
Pearson chi2(4) =  
14.5165    
Pr = 0.006 
 
Table 5: Limit orders by informed and uninformed agents in periods with a bubble or 
mirage. 
Agents type 
Minute Uninformed Informed Total 
Ratio 
informed to 
uninformed 
Test on  
independence 
1 9 5 14 0.56 
2 7 4 11 0.57 
3 9 5 14 0.56 
4 17 3 20 0.18 
5 16 3 19 0.19 
Total 58 20 78 0.34 
Pearson chi2(4) = 
4.3084 
Pr = 0.366 
 
Table 6: Probability that a limit order is placed by an informed agent as a function of 
time, a probit estimation.  
a) In periods with a bubble or mirage 
Probit estimates   Number of obs   =        78 
    LR chi2(1)      =       5.12 
    Prob > chi2     =     0.0236 
Log likelihood = -41.841011   Pseudo R2       =     0.0577 
Dependent variable: agents type (1 informed, 0 uninformed) 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.Interval] 
time -0.004198 0.001888 -2.22 0.026 -0.007899 -0.000497 
cons 0.001212 0.325253 0.00 0.997 -0.636272 0.638695 
b) In non-bubble-mirage periods according 
Probit estimates   Number of obs   =        552 
    LR chi2(1)      =       9.80 
    Prob > chi2     =     0.0017 
Log likelihood =  -372.18583   Pseudo R2       =     0.0130 
Dependent variable: agents type (1 informed, 0 uninformed) 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.Interval] 
time -0.002037 0.000653 -3.12 0.002 -0.003317 -0.000756 
cons 0.164394 0.122222 1.35 0.179 -0.075156 0.403944 
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Table7. Limit orders by informed and uninformed agents by minute and by level of 
information aggregation (bubble and mirage periods vs. non-bubble-mirage periods) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
a  Null hypothesis: difference (1)-(2)=0 
Ratio of limit orders by 
informed to limit orders 
in total 
Minute 
Bubble and 
mirage 
periods (1) 
Non-bubble-
mirage 
periods (2) 
Difference  
(1)-(2) Z-test
a p-value 
1 0.36 0.61 -0.25 -1.766 0.0387 
2 0.36 0.41 -0.05 -0.3231 0.37331 
3 0.36 0.43 -0.07 -0.5292 0.29833 
4 0.15 0.35 -0.2 -1.808 0.0353 
5 0.16 0.4 -0.24 -2.0555 0.01992 
